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RECENT DECISIONS
Other cases have approved diversity of rules flowing from the
applicability of local laws, as against a uniform federal rule. 44 Bumb v.
United States,45 cited as apposite in the opinion, 46 found no reason to im-
pose a uniform federal rule. Bumb held that the Small Business Admin-
istration, presumably staffed by competent personnel familiar with the
laws of the states where it does business, can acquire valid security
interests in the various states. The transaction, local in nature, should
accord with sound and well-established local policies. 47 Justice Fortas
could find no overriding federal interest which would justify overturn-
ing the Texas coverture law in favor of the SBA in United States v.
Yazell,48 and noted Bumb with approval.
The result of this case, as in all cases involving choices among valid
and reasonable policies, will be welcomed or deplored according to the
philosophy of the reader. It is submitted that the result in favor of
mechanic's liens is correct. Choateness has been a tool for appropriating
the benefit of the mechanic's labor and materials to the government,
leaving the artisan with only the surplus after the sovereign's share is
taken. The doctrine has been so strict as to nullify the historical security
of the artisan against the world. On the other hand, the rule of this case,
within the limits of the decision, does not portend disaster for the SBA.
It may require the SBA to use ordinary business prudence, but it for
that agency to argue whether that is a detriment.
WILLIAM J. CARL.
TORTS-MALPRACTICE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS FROM DATE OF DiS-
COVERY NOT FROM DATE OF NEGLIGENT ACT.-In a medical malpractice
action brought ten years after an operation, plaintiff alleged that the
defendant surgeon negligently left a surgical sponge in plaintiff's hip.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, the trial court
holding the action was barred by the statute of limitations.' On appeal,
held, reversed. The statute of limitations did not commence running until
the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the pres-
ence of the foreign object. Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 23 State
Rep. 581, 417 P.2d 469 (Mont. 1966).
Statutes of limitation generally are held to be statutes of repose
"Bumb v. United States, supra note 30; United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 347(1966).
45Ibid.
'Instant case at 821.
"Supra note 44.
"Supra note 44 at 347.
'REVISED CODES OP MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2605(3). (Hereinafter REvISED CODES OF
MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)
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designed to give the defendant protection from long dormant claims.2
This purpose is buttressed by the desire to compel relatively early adjudi-
cations of claims while the evidence and witnesses are easily obtainable.'
Such statutes apply with full force to all claims, whether they are
meritorious or not.4
Actions against physicians for negligence in treating patients are
generally governed by the applicable tort statute of limitation.5 A ma-
jority of jurisdictions follow this concept notwithstanding allegations in
the complaint of a contractual relationship between the doctor and his
patient.6 These courts reason that the gravamen of the action is negli-
genceJ and couching the complaint in contract terms is merely a device
to gain the benefit of the longer contract statute of limitation.8 Other
jurisdictions permit the action to be brought in either tort or contract.9
In a contract action, however, recovery is limited to the d ctor's f pl
consequential damages.'0
In cases where a foreign object is left in the body, various approaches
2Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348
(1944), WooD, LIMITATIONS § 2 (4th ed. 1916); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897); LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, TRIAL Op MEDIcAL MAL-
PRACTICE § 1306 (1960). See also Guiterman v. Wishon, 21 Mont. 458, 54 Pac. 566
(1898).
8Order of B. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra note 2, at 348.
'Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 985 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
5PRosSER, TORTS § 30 (3d ed. 1964); WooD, op. cit. supra note 2, § 179; LOUISELL &
WILLIAMS, Op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 13.14 to 13.64; R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2605(3) pro-
vides for a three year limitation for tort actions. See generally Lillick, The Mal-
practice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL
L.Q. 339 (1962), Boone, Torts-The Statute of Limitations as Applied in Malpractice
Cases, 27 ALA. L. REV. 188 (1964). See also 1942 Leg. Doc. No. 65, 1942 Report,
N. Y. Law Revision Commission 135. Oregon proposed a specific statute of limita-
tions to apply in malpractice cases and this was rejected by their legislature. See
Oregon, SENATE AND HOUSE JOURNAL, p. 758 (1963), for a discussion of the proposed
legislation.
6See Practice and Pleading-Statutes of Limitations-Malpractice, 27 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 147 (1952), Coady v. Reins, 1 Mont. 424 (1872), held: "But the statute [of
limitations] in cases of this nature begins to run, regardless of the form of action,
whether case or assumpsit, from the time of the negligence or breach of duty." At
least 15 states have enacted specific limitations barring actions against physicians
whether in contract or tort. See Litell, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations,
21 IND. L.J. 23, 40 (1945).
'Coulter v. Sharp, 145 Kan. 28, 64 P.2d 564 (1937). In actions against persons en-
gaged in a public calling such as physicians and common carriers, the common law
recognized implied obligations of due care and allowed the plaintiff to bring his
action in case or assumpsit. Since modern code pleading required the plaintiff to
allege only the facts constituting his cause of action, some courts have held that the
action sounds in tort and the contract statute of limitations is not applicable. See
SHIPMAN, PLEADING § 41 (3d ed. 1923); I CHITTY, PLEADING 149, 183 (16th ed.
1876); CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 47 (2d ed. 1947). In Montana, M. R. Civ. P. 2, 8(a)
and R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2605(3) are applicable and plaintiff need only state concise
facts showing that pleader is entitled to relief.
"Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964) (failure to remove
surgical sponge), Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320 (1961).
OConklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529 (1930) (failure to remove
forceps) ; See Littel, supra note 6.
10In New York, if the plaintiff demands damages peculiar to tort actions, he is
governed by the tort statute of limitation; if damages are peculiar to contract he is
governed by the contract statute of limitations. Thus the type of damages obtained
would depend upon how the claimant framed his complaint. Conklin v. Draper supra
note 9.
[Vol. 28
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have developed for determining when the tort limitation period begins
to run. There is substantial authority that the claim for relief is created
and the statutory period begins to run at the instant of the doctor's
wrongful act." Thus, plaintiff's right of action accrues when the incision
is closed over the foreign object. This "right" may be delusory if the
object is not discovered before the statute has barred the action.1 2 Where
courts have mechanically appplied this "wrongful act rule"'13 to all claims,
harsh results have followed.'4
An exception to the wrongful act rule is applicable where there has
been an act of concealment by the physician preventing the plaintiff's
discovery of his claim for relief. 5 Jurisdictions which recognize this
exception hold that concealment of a patient's claim constitutes fraud,
and that the statute of limitations is tolled until the patient discovers his
injury.'6 Usually the fraudulent concealment doctrine requires the
physician's actual knowledge of his negligence and affirmative conduct
in concealing the negligence from the patient.1 7 Some jurisdictions have
held that the physician has a duty to disclose his negligent acts to the
patient and breach of this duty by remaining silent constitutes fraudu-
lent concealment'18
A variation of the fraudulent concealment doctrine is the theory of
"constructive fraud," which arises out of the fiduciary or confidential
relationship. 9 The plaintiff still has the burden of proving negligence,
but apparently the mere presence of a foreign object in the body consti-
tutes fraudulent concealment and tolls the statute until reasonable dis-
covery is made by the patient.20 In Burton v. Tribble,2 the Arkansas
uPRossEa, op. cit. supra note 5; WOOD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 179; Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d
320, 368 (1961).
"Vaughn v. Langmack, 236 Ore. 542, 390 P.2d 142, 160 (1963). (See dissent's discus-
sion of the so-called I I delusionary right. " ')
"The wrongful act rule is often referred to as the "general rule." Cappucci v.
Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N.E. 653 (1929).
"In Graham v. Updegraph, 144 Kan. 45, 58 P.2d 475 (1936) application of this
doctrine created shocking results. The court held that an action was barred by the
two year statute of limitation where radium beads were negligently permitted to
remain in the body of a patient, despite assurances by the physician to the contrary.
The beads ultimately caused the death of the patient six years later, at which time
they were discovered. See also Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N.Y.S. 139
(1926) (active concealment of a tooth which became lodged in defendant's lung).
'Murray v. Allen, 103 Vt. 373, 154 Atl. 678 (1931) (failure to remove sponge). For
excellent definition in a statute embodying this rule, see DeHaan v. Winter, 258
Mich. 293, 241 N.W. 923 (1932) Accord, Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 81 N.W.2d
888 (1957).
"Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N.W. 633 (1931).
"Carter v. Harlan Hosp. Assn., 265 Ky. 452, 97 S.W.2d 9 (1936).
'Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 (1940) (sponge left in body 14 years);
Hinkle v. Hargen, supra note 14, where doctor remained silent for 21 years about
needle left in patient's back, held, that silence on the part of one who has duty to
disclose constitutes fraudulent concealment. See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1317
(1930).
"Acton v. Morrison, 62 Ariz. 139, 155 P.2d 782 (1945), aff'd, Morrison v. Acton, 68
Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590 (1948).
*Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
l189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503 (1934). Compare Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 486, 123
S.W.2d 520, 523 (1939).
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Court inferred the doctor's intent to conceal a ball of gauze negligently left
in the patient's abdomen. In Rosane v. Senger,22 Colorado allowed con-
structive fraud to toll the statute even though plaintiff did not allege
the physician knew of the foreign object's presence. In Morrison v.
Acton,23 a dentist's drill broke inside plaintiff's jaw. The plaintiff con-
tinued to see the dentist in an effort to discover what was causing the
pain and was repeatedly assured that the pain was a natural result of
the extraction operation. Four years later the same dentist X-rayed the
jaw and again assured the patient nothing was abnormal. Later another
dentist found the piece of drill and testified that it was easily discernible.
The Arizona Court, relying upon a fiction of implied fraud, held that
the defendant should have known of the broken drill and his failure to
disclose this information constituted constructive fraud. The statute of
limitations was tolled until the patient discovered the piece of drill. This
decision repudiated the necessity to prove scienter as an element of
fraudulent concealment. 2
4
Another theory used to toll the statute of limitations in malpractice
actions is the "end of treatment doctrine." This theory was first an-
nounced in Gillette v. Tucker,2 5 where a physician failed to remove a
sponge from a patient. The court held that the statute of limitations did
not begin to run until the physician had terminated his treatment. The
court reasoned that the physician had a duty to complete the operation
and failure to remove the sponge constituted continuing negligence each
second the patient was under his treatment. 2 Under this doctrine, when
the patient changes physicians, the continuing negligence ends and the
statute of limitations begins to run, even though the patient may not
discover the object until many years later..2 7 Nevertheless, the statute
might start running before treatment has ended if the patient discovers
or reasonably should have discovered the negligence before the treatment
has terminated.2 8 The end of treatment doctrine eases the harshness of
the wrongful act rule in cases where the treatment is continuing, but is
not helpful where a specialist performs the operation and immediately
thereafter terminates his services, leaving post-operative care to another
physician.
The most modern theory used to toll the statute of limitations is the
"discovery doctrine" adopted by the instant case.29 This doctrine first
-Supra note 20.
'Supra note 19.
2 Ibid.
167 Ohio 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902).
'Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N.Y.S. 608 (1923); Thatcher v. De Tar, 351
Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943); Budoff v. Kessler, 284 App. Div. 1049, 135
N.Y.S.2d 717 (1954).
'End of treatment does not always mean formal discharge. The physician need only
to have ceased to treat the particular injury or malady in question. Schmitt v.
Esser, 183 Minn. 354, 236 N.W. 622 (1931).
'Supra note 26.
'Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 1.54 A.2d 788 (1959) (sponge).
[Vol. 28
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arose in the early case of Hahn v. Claybrook,30 involving discoloration of
the skin caused by excessive appplication of argentum oxide. The Mary-
land Court reasoned that the statute of limitations began to run when the
plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the negligence. However,
the court held that the patient was barred by the statute of limitations
because he should have discovered the injury more than three years be-
fore the action was commenced since the injury was external and easily
discernible.3 1 California adopted the discovery doctrine in Huysman v.
Kirsh,32 involving a rubber drainage tube left in plaintiff's body 3 3 and
has since applied the discovery doctrine to cases involving radium ex-
posure treatments,3 4 negligent surgical operations, 35 administration of
drugs, 36 and dental malpractice. 37  The recent Idaho case of Billings v.
Sisters of Mercy,38 applied the discovery doctrine where a sponge was dis-
covered 1.5 years after it was left in the patient's body.39
Prior to the instant case, Montana had apparently adopted the
"wrongful act rule." In Coady v. Reins, 40 plaintiff sued to recover dam-
ages from a physician for negligence in setting and treating her fractured
arm. The court held that the statute of limitations began to run at the
instant of negligent treatment and not from the time the patient dis-
covered the harm. But the court in the instant case held that where a
foreign object is left in the body and the patient is ignorant of the fact
of its presence, the statute of limitations begins to run when the patient
discovers or reasonably should discover its presence.41
Justice Doyle, dissenting, claimed the majority overruled Coady by
implication even though the facts of the two cases differ.42 This raises
the question of whether Montana will apply the discovery doctrine to
all types of malpractice in the future. Cases involving foreign objects
left in the body are relatively rare, but there is the possibility that Mon-
tana will follow California, and apply the discovery doctrine to all types
of medical malpractice. 43 Should this occur, it is submitted that the num-
'-130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917).
"nIbid.
"6 Cal.2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
'Trombly v. Kolts, 29 Cal. App.2d 699, 85 P.2d 541 (1938). See also Calvin v.
Thayer, 150 Cal. App.2d 610, 310 P.2d 59 (1957) (Action against physician for in-
correct diagnosis.) But see earlier case which adopted end of treatment doctrine.
Gum v. Allen, 119 Cal. App. 293, 6 P.2d 311 (1931).
'Hurlimann v. Bank of America, 141 Cal. App.2d 801, 297 P.2d 682 (1956).
"Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 161 Cal. App.2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958).
'Agnew v. Larson, 82 Cal. App.2d 176, 185 P.2d 851 (1947).
"Faith v. Erhart, 52 Cal. App.2d 228, 126 P.2d 151 (1942).
'Supra note 8.
"Ibid.
Coady v. Reins, supra note 6.
'Instant case at 473.
421bid.
'For example, external treatment of skin, treatment of fractures, X-ray treatments,
administration of drugs, dental surgery, negligent diagnosis, and any number of other
various treatments and operations not involving foreign objects left in the body, are
all possible cases in which the discovery doctrine may apply if extended by the court.
19661
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ber of medical malpractice claims in litigation will probably increase."
In determining whether to allow the discovery doctrine in foreign
object cases, two basic policies of the law are in conflict: 1. The policy
that there should come a time when the physician ought to be secure in
his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient
claims against him.45 The policy of allowing claimants an opportunity to
present meritorious claims when they discover they have been harmed.46
The primary argument for protecting the physician appears to be the
injustice of depriving him of security from the threat of suits after a
long period of time.47 This argument is countered by the reasoning that
the patient should be allowed to bring his claim. The physician is pro-
tected by the fact that the patient still must prove negligence.48 The
plaintiff's case will be burdened by the necessity of gathering evidence
which will probably be more difficult to obtain because of a lapse of time.
Also, the plaintiff must prove that he used reasonable diligence in dis-
covering the injury or the statute will commence running at the time he
reasonably should have discovered the wrong. 49 Another factor which
should influence application of the discovery doctrine is the relative
ability of the parties to bear the loss. 50 Defendant physicians probably
can better absorb the loss because of the availability of medical malprac-
tice liability insurance. It is likely that a majority of physicians will be
insured for this type of loss.
It is submitted that non-discovery of a hidden object which has been
negligently left in the body provides an adequate reason to judicially
withhold the commencement of the limitation period. Medical science
discloses that foreign objects such as sponges and needles can remain in
the body for long periods without causing harm or before harm occurs.51
Thus, it is reasonable to allow a claimant his day in court after the hidden
object which eventually causes harm is discovered. As Justice Rosman
stated in his dissent against the wrongful act rule in Vaughn v. Lang-
mack :52
"Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724, 733 (1954).
"Supra note 2.
'
0PRossEa, op. cit. supra note 5.
'
TGangloff v. Apfelbach, 319 Ill. App. 596, 49 N.E.2d 795, 799 (1943). This case
involved the treatment of a fractured elbow and the court adopted the wrongful act
rule quoting Patten v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Tenn. 438, 55.S.W.2d 759 (1933):
Recognition of a contrary rule would permit a plaintiff, afflicted with
some malady, to trace that malady to an original cause alleged to have
occurred years and years ago. No practicing physicians or dentist would
ever be safe. The origin of disease is involved in uncertainty at best.
While hardships may arise in particular cases by reason of this ruling,
a contrary ruling would be inimical to the repose of society and promote
litigation of a character too uncertain and too speculative.to be encouraged.
"PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 5.
'
9 Supra note 30.
5PRossFa, op. cit. supra note 5, § 4. But see MCCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 168 (1954).
612 CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY 249 (1962).
OVaughn v. Langmaclk, supra note 12, at 155.
[Vol. 28
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.... who can explain why an individual who is anesthetized [during
an operation] should be charged with knowledge that his surgeon
failed to remove an object which he had placed in the incision? In
fact, who can explain why a person should be charged with knowl-
edge of anything that is unknown or unknowable?
It is illogical and unjust to bar a claim because a person did not
discover a wrong which is of its very nature "inherently unknowable," 53
such as a sponge closed in an incision. The rejection of the wrongful act
rule by the court in the instant case was a choice between the jeopardy
which practitioners may face in defending old claims and affording a
claimant an opportunity for a day in court. In choosing the latter, Mon-
tana has adopted a modern minority rule which is rooted in the basic
legal maxim: "For every wrong there is a remedy.
'54
EARL J. HANSON.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: SEARCH OF BODILY CAvITIES.-Defendants John
Blefare and Donald Michel were convicted in federal district court of
smuggling heroin. They had been stopped and searched by Customs
agents, who had reliable information that the defendants were coming
across the border from Mexico with heroin in their stomachs. The heroin
was recovered from Blefare by restraining him sufficiently to pass a tube
through his nose and into his stomach to allow the introduction of an
emetic. The two packets of heroin thus recovered were received in evi-
dence over the objection of defendants. On appeal to federal circuit
court, defendants claimed the method of obtaining the heroin was vio-
lative of their Federal Constitutional rights and the packets should not
have been admitted into evidence. Held: Convictions affirmed. The pro-
cedure used to obtain the packets was not unreasonable, and did not
violate "due process." Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir.
1966).
In affirming the reasonableness of the search the majority cites no
specific standards, but rather confines itself to an analysis of the facts.
The concurring opinion helpfully points out in a footnote that the court
was applying the standard of reasonableness first laid down in Boyd v.
53The phrase "inherently unknowable" harm was first used by Justice Rutledge in
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949) in reference to the time of discovery
of the disease of silicosis as covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act. Justice
Rutledge in rejecting the wrongful act rule, stated:
[m]echanical analysis of the accrual of petitioner's injury-whether
breath by breath, or at one unrecorded moment in the progress of the
disease-can only serve to thwart the congressional purpose . . . . It
would mean that at some past moment in tife, unknown and inherently
unknowable even in retrospect, Urie was charged with knowledge . . ..
-R.C.M. 1947, § 49-115 provides: "For every wrong there is a remedy."
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7
Hanson: Torts—Malpractice
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1966
